Contemporary philosophers of mind tend to assume that the world of nature can be reduced to basic physics. Yet there are features of the mind consciousness, intentionality, normativity that do not seem to be reducible to physics or neuroscience. This explanatory gap between mind and brain has thus been a major cause of concern in recent philosophy of mind. Reductionists hold that, despite all appearances, the mind can be reduced to the brain. Eliminativists hold that it cannot, and that this (...) implies that there is something illegitimate about the mentalistic vocabulary. Dualists hold that the mental is irreducible, and that this implies either a substance or a property dualism. Mysterian non-reductive physicalists hold that the mind is uniquely irreducible, perhaps due to some limitation of our self-understanding. In this book, Steven Horst argues that this whole conversation is based on assumptions left over from an outdated philosophy of science. While reductionism was part of the philosophical orthodoxy fifty years ago, it has been decisively rejected by philosophers of science over the past thirty years, and for good reason. True reductions are in fact exceedingly rare in the sciences, and the conviction that they were there to be found was an artifact of armchair assumptions of 17th century Rationalists and 20th century Logical Empiricists. The explanatory gaps between mind and brain are far from unique. In fact, in the sciences it is gaps all the way down.And if reductions are rare in even the physical sciences, there is little reason to expect them in the case of psychology. Horst argues that this calls for a complete re-thinking of the contemporary problematic in philosophy of mind. Reductionism, dualism, eliminativism and non-reductive materialism are each severely compromised by post-reductionist philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind is in need of a new paradigm. Horst suggests that such a paradigm might be found in Cognitive Pluralism: the view that human cognitive architecture constrains us to understand the world through a plurality of partial, idealized, and pragmatically-constrained models, each employing a particular representational system optimized for its own problem domain. Such an architecture can explain the disunities of knowledge, and is plausible on evolutionary grounds. (shrink)

This book introduces an account of cognitive architecture, Cognitive Pluralism, on which the basic units of understanding are models of particular content domains. Having many mental models is a good adaptive strategy for cognition, but models can be incompatible with one another, leading to paradoxes and inconsistencies of belief, and it may not be possible to integrate the understanding supplied by multiple models into a comprehensive and self-consistent "super model". The book applies the theory to explaining intuitive reasoning and cognitive (...) illusions and explores implications for epistemology, semantics, and disunity of science. (shrink)

In this carefully argued critique, Steven Horst pronounces the theory deficient.

Since the seventeenth century, our understanding of the natural world has been one of phenomena that behave in accordance with natural laws. While other elements of the early modern scientific worldview may be rejected or at least held in question—the metaphor of the world as a great machine, the narrowly mechanist assumption that all physical interactions must be contact interactions, the idea that matter might actually be obeying rules laid down by its Divine Author – the notion of natural law (...) has continued to play a pivotal role in actual scientific practice, in our philosophical interpretations of science, and in their its metaphysical implications. (shrink)

In den drei Büchern der Schrift Über die Seele begründet Aristoteles erst-mals eine philosophische Psychologie als eigene Disziplin, welche empirisch von den Lebensfunktionen auf allen Stufen des Lebendigen ausgehend zu definitorischen Bestimmungen der verschiedenen seelischen Prinzipien kommt, besonders auch zum Vernunftprinzip des Menschen. Diese Ausgabe stützt sich auf die bekannten großen kommentierten Ausgaben des letzten und dieses Jahrhunderts. Der griechische Text ist der Teubner-Ausgabe entnommen; einige Varianten der Oxforder Ausgabe von Ross sind verzeichnet worden. Die Übersetzung orientiert sich an W. (...) Theiler, sucht jedoch eigene Wege des geeigneten Ausdrucks und gliedert zum besseren Verständnis häufiger Sinneinheiten ab, denen der Kommentar folgt. Mit Einleitung, Literaturhinweisen und Registern zum griechischen und deutschen Text. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 57 Heft: 1 Seiten: 138-154.

During the past three decades the Utrecht scholar Jaap Mansfeld has built up a formidable reputation in the field of the history of ancient philosophy. This state-of-the-art collection of articles is presented to him by colleagues and friends on his sixtieth birthday.

In this essay an attempt will be made to trace the origins and history of the accusation that Jews are cannibals. Its origins go back much further into history than most people know, and for that reason it is this aspect of our topic that will receive the most attention. At the same time, it will be demonstrated that this anti-Jewish myth has an unprecedented tenacity, since it is still readily believed in by millions up until the present day. Part (...) I: Antiquity1Frist Encounters The encounters between Jews, on the one hand, and Greeks and Romans, on the.. (shrink)

(1996). Korte Notities Over Het Godsbegrip Bij Grieken En Romeinen En De Vergoddelijking Van Jezus in Het Nieuwe Testament. Bijdragen: Vol. 57, No. 2, pp. 149-157.

This book offers a sustained critique of the computational theory of mind that deserves the attention of those interested in the presuppositions and implications of computational psychology. Horst begins by laying out the theory, reconstructing its perceived role in vindicating intentional psychology, and recounting earlier critiques on which he builds. Part 2, the heart of the book, analyzes a notion central to CTM—that of a symbol—arguing that symbols are conventional. In Part 3 Horst applies the results of this (...) analysis to CTM to diagnose a serious confusion in its account of semantic properties and the corresponding notion of mental representation. Part 4 offers an alternative perspective on computational psychology, suggesting a separation of the practice of computational psychology from the philosophical claims made by CTM. (shrink)

Observation of Reality and Theory Creation in Panagiotis Kondylis’ Thought In the first part of the paper the authors present an outline of the Polish perception of thoughts and ideas of Panagiotis Kondylis which has started to develop only recently. This is followed by demonstrating major issues present in the output of this Greek philosopher who was strongly linked both with Greece and with Germany. The paper closes with a discussion of Kondylis’ concept of theory creation demonstrated in his work (...) entitled Theorie des Krieges. Clausewitz – Marx – Engels – Lenin which was published in Stuttgart in 1998. Although the very foundation of his ideas is the theory of war by Carl von Clausewitz whom Kondylis perceived as a conceptual soul mate, the discussion per se is of a more universal nature and may pertain to the essence of developing any theory. The paper is to help the Polish reader to understand the ideas and thoughts of Kondylis, and thus to facilitate the perception of translations of his texts that were published in Studies in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

It has recently been claimed (1) that mental states such as beliefs are theoretical entities and (2) that they are therefore, in principle, subject to theoretical elimination if intentional psychology were to be supplanted by a psychology not employing mentalistic notions. Debate over these two issues is seriously hampered by the fact that the key terms 'theoretical' and 'belief' are ambiguous. This article argues that there is only one sense of 'theoretical' that is of use to the eliminativist, and in (...) this sense some kinds of "belief" (dispositional states, infra-conscious states and the Freudian unconscious) are indeed "theoretical" and hence possible candidates for elimination, while others (consciously occurring thoughts like judgements and perceptual Gestalten) are not theoretical and hence not candidates for elimination. (shrink)

This is a review of a book that tries to re-establish mind-body dualism by using (a) empirical research on near-death experiences, placebo effects, creativity, claiming even that parapsychology should become a respected part of science, and (b) Frederic W. H. Myers' (1843-1901) metaphor of the brain as a kind of receiving device that records what the irreducible mind sends as messages. Among other things, we criticize the lack of philosophical clarity about mind-body relation, and question the book's tendency to refer (...) to past and current parapsychological literature as reliable. (shrink)

The concept of supermatrix for social scientists was first introduced by Paul Horst. The main purpose of his book was to introduce this concept to social scientists, students, teachers and research workers who lacked mathematical training. This book introduces the concept of fuzzy super matrices and operations on them. The author has provided only those operations on fuzzy supermatrices that are essential for developing super fuzzy multi expert models. This book will be highly useful to social scientists who wish (...) to work with multi expert models. (shrink)

In this book, the authors introduce the notion of Super linear algebra and super vector spaces using the definition of super matrices defined by Horst (1963). Many theorems on super linear algebra and its properties are proved. Some theorems are left as exercises for the reader. These new class of super linear algebras which can be thought of as a set of linear algebras, following a stipulated condition, will find applications in several fields using computers. The authors feel that (...) such a paradigm shift is essential in this computerized world. (shrink)

Contents: Foreword. Wolfgang BALZER and C. ULISES MOULINES: Introduction. José A. DÍEZ CALZADA: Structuralist Analysis of Theories of Fundamental Measurement. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA and Pedro REYES: The Theory of Finite Games in Extensive Form. Hans Joachim BURSCHEID und Horst STRUVE: The Theory of Stochastic Fairness - its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification. Wolfgang BALZER and Richard MATTESSICH: Formalizing the Basis of Accounting. Werner DIEDERICH: A Reconstruction of Marxian Economics. Bert HAMMINGA and Wolfgang BALZER: The Basic Structure of (...) Neoclassical General Equilibrium Theory. Klaus MANHART: Balance Theories: Two Reconstructions and the Problem of Intended Applications. Rainer WESTERMANN: Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Structuralist Theory-Net. Rainer REISENZEIN: Wundt's Three-Dimensional Theory of Emotion. Pablo LORENZANO: Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics. Hinne HETTEMA and Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Formalisation of the Periodic Table. C. ULISES MOULINES: The Basic Core of Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics. Thomas BARTELBORTH: An Axiomatization of Classical Electrodynamics. Author's Index. Subject Index. (shrink)